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INTRODUCTION

Governmental immunity, in its strongest form, forgives the sovereign its "legal irresponsibility" 1 by excusing it from suit in court. It is
an odd notion for a democratic system of government. 2 And yet, a resil"3
ient core of conservative Justices has been carrying on a "love affair
with the concept of sovereign immunity and, particularly, state sovereign
immunity for many years. The Court has advanced and reaffirmed many
times the theory that state sovereign immunity was written into the Constitution by the Eleventh Amendment. 4 In the face of this jurisprudence,
Congress finds its job of regulating "our vast national economy " 5 increasingly more difficult. The bankruptcy venue is no exception. The
recent Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,6 holding
that Congress is not empowered by its Article I plenary powers to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, has placed sizable obstacles in the path of efficient bankruptcy administration. 7 Considering
the frequency with which the states are named as defendants or respondents in bankruptcy cases, the repercussions of this case are many. The
possible responses to it, however, are not.
In Section II of this article, I review certain seminal Eleventh
Amendment Supreme Court cases to Frovide a brief overview of the
evolution of state sovereign immunity. Next, in Section III, I review

* J.D., 1989, Boston College Law School; LL.M., 1997, New York University
School of Law. I would like to thank Lawrence P. King, Peter E. Meltzer, and Colleen
C. Maher for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to
Christopher Eisgruber and Larry Kramer for suggestions regarding discrete constitutional
law issues concerning my topic.
1 "As to the states, legal irresponsibility was written into the Eleventh Amendment
.. "
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939)
(emphasis added).
See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEvENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY vii,

150-64 (1972); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1143 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity is
"particularly unsuitable for incorporation into the law of this democratic Nation," and
justifying its existence on the grounds that it preserves the "dignity" of the states is an
"'embarrassingly insufficient' rationale for the rule." (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)p'See United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; infra Section II.
5 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
7 See infra Section III.B.
8 See infta Section 11.
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specifically those bankruptcy cases decided by the Court that contribute
to the development of the immunity issue. 9 In this section I also analyze
the Seminole Tribe case. 10 Although Seminole Tribe was not a bankruptcy case, its obvious ramifications for bankruptcy practice make its
consideration with other bankruptcy cases appropriate. Finally, in Section IV, I question whether attempting to circumvent Seminole Tribe in
bankruptcy can be squared with recent scholarship endeavoring to identify a normative justification for bankruptcy law and define limits on its
proper application." Determining that it can, I then consider certain responses to the state immunity problem in bankruptcy.12 I conclude that
none of these measures for neutralizing Seminole Tribe appear up to the
task. Certainly none of these measures will restore the states to a position of full accountability in the bankruptcy process.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's approach to state immunity has always been
highly political.' 3 Not surrisingly, opinions on the subject are inconsistent and hard to reconcile.
By the latter half of this century, however,
certain attributes of state immunity have emerged even if their legal and
historical predicates are uncertain.
A. Article III of the Constitution and Chisholm v. Georgia
Article Ill, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity, aris-

ing under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ["Federal
Question" Clause];--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
9 See infra Section III.A.
10

See infra Section III.B.

11 See infta Section IV.A.

12 See infra Sections IV.B., IV.C.
13 See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation,83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1889, 2003 (1983) (noting that "[tihe history of the
eleventh amendment is in large measure an unflinching political one.").
14

See

HOwARD FINK & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICrION:

POLICY AND

PRACTICE 137 (1984) (asserting that "[t]he case law of the eleventh amendment is replete
with historical anomalies, internal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions."); JACOBS,
supra note 2, at 150 (explaining that "[jiudicial defense of sovereign immunity has been,
at best, episodic and equivocal."); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
25 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (lamenting "the Court's inability to develop a coherent doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity .... ").
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Party;-4o Controversies between two or more States;---between a
State and Citizens of another State ["Citizen-State Diversity"
Clause];--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,--and
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
between a State,
15
or Subjects.

Given the tenor of the times at ratification (as evidenced by the great
federalist debate itself), it is not hard to understand why the Citizen-State
Diversity Clause gave anti-federalists a cause for concern. This concern
seemed founded when the Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia1 6 in 1793.
In that case, a citizen of South Carolina filed a common-law assumpsit
action against the State of Georgia for the nonpayment of a debt."
Georgia objected, raising its common law sovereign immunity as a bar to
the suit.18 The majority 19 concluded that Article III abolished the states'
common law sovereign° immunity in federal court and permitted Chisholm's suit to proceed.
Justice Iredell, at the time the most junior member of the Court,
filed a dissenting opinion that is commonly believed to provide the basis
for the Eleventh Amendment. 21 Although not without some inconsistency, the dissent advanced the proposition that a state's common-law
sovereign immunity should be recognized by federal courts as a matter of
comity unless clearly withdrawn by an act of Congress: "My opinion
being, that even if the constitution would admit of the exercise of such a
power [i.e., federal court jurisdiction over a Citizen-State Diversity action], a new law is necessary for the purpose, since no part of the existing law applies .

. . . "22

Turning to the Judiciary Act of 1789, which

15 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
16 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
17 See id. at 419-20, 428-29.
18 See id.at 419. Consistent with its position, Georgia refused to take part in oral

argument before the Court. See id.
19 It is difficult to summarize the "position" of the majority as each Justice on the
Court, consistent with existing practice, filed an opinion "seriatim" in reverse order of
seniority. See id.at 429. For a brief personal history of the Justices of the Court and
their respective roles in the ratification debate, see JACOBS, supra note 2, at 50-51.
20 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451, 453 (opinion of Justice Blair);
id.at 458,
463-66 (opinion of Justice Wilson); id.at 466-69 (opinion of Justice Cushing); i0. at 472,
476, 478, 479 (opinion of Chief Justice Jay); id.at 480 (order of the Court).
21 See id. at 429-50 (redell, J., dissenting); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "Justice Iredell['s ... dissenprovided the blueprint for the Eleventh Amendment.").
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) at 449 (redell, J., dissenting). Justice Iredell saw
nothing in the law that illustrated Congress's intention to withdraw the states' sovereign
immunity. "I conceive, that all the courts of the United States must receive ... all their
authority... from the legislature only.
This appears to me to be one of those

1997]

STATE IMMUNITY IN BANKRUPTCY

33

codified federal jurisdiction at that time, Justice Iredell saw no evidence
that Copgress intended to abolish the states' common-law sovereign immunity.2" Because the Act instructed federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with "principles and usages of law," Justice Iredell quite sensibly concluded that state common-law sovereign immunity
was one of those principles for which the federal court must account.
In order to arrive at Justice Iredell's conclusion, one need not assume that
sovereign immunity is beyond the reach of Congress to affect, although
the dissent has been interpreted as advancing that very proposition.
cases... in which an article of the Constitution [i.e., the Citizen-State Diversity Clause
of Article I1] cannot be effectuated without the intervention of the legislative authority."
Id. at 432 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Justice Iredell continued:
The authority [of the federal courts] extends only to the decision of controversies in which a State is a party, and providing laws necessary for that
purpose. That surely can refer only to such controversies in which a State
can be a party; in respect to which, if any question arises, it can be determined... in no other manner than by a reference either to pre-existent
laws, or laws passed under the Constitution and in conformity to it.
Id. at 436 (Iredell, J., dissenting). "[A]s the law stands at present, [this action against the
state] is not maintainable; whatever opinion may be entertained, upon the construction of
the Constitution, as to the power of Congress to authorize such a one." Id. at 437
(Iredell, J., dissenting). See generally id. at 432-50 (Iredeli, J., dissenting) (providing
further reasoning for his conclusions). Accord John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice
Iredell'sDissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L. REv. 255, 263-66 (1994).
Despite the uniformity of Justice Iredell's thesis, in an admirably restrained response
to the majority's editorializations, Justice Iredell argued somewhat inconsistently that the
Constitution might bar outright suits against nonconsenting states:
So much, however, has been said on the Constitution, that it may not be
improper to intimate, that my present opinion is strongly against any construction of it, which will admit, under the circumstances, a compulsive suit
against a statefor the recovery of money. I think every word in the Constitution may have its full effect without involving this consequence, and
that nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication (neither
of which I consider, can be found in this case) would authorize the deduction of so high a power. This opinion I hold, however, with all the reserve
proper for one, which, according to my sentiments in this case, may be
deemed in some measure extra-judicial.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); cf.
JACOBS, supra note 2, at 51 (describing Justice Iredell's parting shot as a diversion from
what was to that point a "model of self-restraint.").
23 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 433-37 (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
24 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 436-37 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
It follows, therefore, unquestionably, I think, that looking at the act of
Congress, which I consider is on this occasion the limit of our authority
(whatever further might be constitutionally, enacted) we can exercise no
authority in the present instance consistently with the clear intention of the
act, but such as a proper State Court would have been at least competent to
exercise at the time the act was passed.
Id.
25 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
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Whatever Justice Iredell had in mind, there is no doubt that Chisholm
reignited the concerns of the anti-federalists, and led to the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment. 2 6
B.

The Eleventh Amendment and Hans v. Louisiana

The Eleventh Amendment is narrowly tailored, seemingly in response to the specific facts of the Chisholm case: "The Judicial Power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." 27 The Amendment certainly divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over cases formerly arising under the Citizen-State Diversity
Clause. But what effect does the Eleventh Amendment impose upon a
rin in part and dissenting in part); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (explaining that "[the
decision of the Court, in the case of Chisholm [v.] Georgia ...produced a proposition in
Congress, for amending the Constitution of the United States .

. . .");

accord H.G. Con-

nor, James Iredell: Lai4yer, Statesman, Judge, 60 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 244 (1912); Gibbons, supra note 13, at 1926-27; Orth, supra note 22, at 256. Indeed, struck by a point
made by Justice Wilson in Chisholm, the editor of the second edition of the Dallas reports
felt compelled to add an editorial footnote expressing "[nlo wonder, that such a judicial
harangue produced the 11th amendment to the constitution." See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 465,
ed. n.1; see also JACOBS, supra note 2, at 52 (declaring that "as a state paper, [Wilson's
opinion] was at least impolitic; many contemporary statesmen and politicians read it as an
exercise in judicial usurpation, which called for repudiation.").
Whether the majority's holding in Chisholm caused "such a shock of surprise that
the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted," as suggested by the Court
in Principalityof Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934) (reiterating a similar
observation made by the Court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890)), is itself
debated by the majority and dissent in Seminole Tribe. The majority in that case repeated
the Monaco Court's historical assessment of the reaction to Chisholm without further inquiry. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1130. The dissent, on the other hand, chided
the majority for its proliferation of Monaco's "erroneous assertion" concerning the reaction to Chisholm, noting that "Monaco's ipse dixit that Chisholm created a 'shock of surprise' does not make it so. This Court's opinions frequently make assertions of historical
fact, but those assertions are not authoritative as to history in the same way that our interpretations of laws are authoritative as to them." Id. at 1148 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The dissent then undertook a comprehensive historical sojourn and concluded that the
Chisholm opinion did not cause the uproar that the majority had suggested. See id. at
1148-52 (Souter, J., dissenting); accord Steven Breker-Cooper, The Eleventh Amendment: A Textual Solution, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1481, 1483 n.9 (1992) (noting that the
"leisurely pace" at which the Eleventh Amendment was finally ratified belies the notion
that Chisholm "enraged" the nation). The actual reaction to the case was probably
somewhere in the middle. The fact that the Eleventh Amendment was proposed two days
after Chisholm was decided is fairly conclusive evidence that the states were shocked and
surprised about something. Whether that was shock and surprise about being haled into
federal court by a noncitizen over a common law debt claim, or about being haled into
federal court period, is unclear. For a thorough history of the Chisholm decision's aftermath, see JACOBS, supra note 2, at 55-67.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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suit by a citizen against his or her own state? Was it intended that the
Eleventh Amendment, despite its language, extend to that situation as
well, or did the drafters of the Amendment purposefully exclude that

procedural posture?
In 1890, the Court answered this question in its controversial decision in Hans v. Louisiana.28 Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, filed suit
against his own state alleging that Louisiana had impaired its agreement

with him contrary to the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.

Thus,

unlike Chisholm, the Hans case involved a suit by a citizen against his
own state (a situation not covered by the express language of the Eleventh Amendment), and, more important to present purposes, concerned a
federal question. Despite these significant, distinguishing characteristics,
the Court concluded that the suit could not be maintained in federal court
without Louisiana's consent. 30 Although the Court acknowledged that
the actual language of the Eleventh Amendment did not compel its conclusion, the Court chose to recognize a broader immunity in order to

avoid the "anomaly" of permitting a citizen to do that which a noncitizen
could not.31
28 134 U.S. 1 (1890). For critical commentary on the Hans decision and the uses to
which more contemporary cases have put it, see JACOBS, supra note 2; JOHN V. ORTH,
THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1987); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); William Burnham, Taming the Eleventh
Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 931
(1990); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1972); William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather Than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, supra note 13; Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns:
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REv. 61 (1984).
29 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1-3; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
30 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15-21. The case involved a civil war debt owed by Louisiana to Hans. See Gibbons, supra note 13, at 1976-77; Orth, supra note 22, at 257.
Some have speculated that the Court chose to read an expansive immunity into the Eleventh Amendment rather than order the debt paid and face the inevitable challenge to the
federal government's supremacy when Louisiana refused. See Gibbons, supra note 13, at
1974, 2000 (asserting that the court needed to avoid "the humiliation of seeing its political
authority compromised" and that "the justices needed a way to let the South win the repudiation war."); cf Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821)
(suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment was passed to assuage the fears of heavily indebted states that their creditors might sue them in federal court). But cf. JACOBS, supra
note 2, at 4 (arguing that "the rather simplistic view that the purpose of the [Eleventh]
amendment was to relieve the states of an enforceable obligation to pay their debts seems
scarcely tenable in the light of various factors, including the strong support it received
from creditor-oriented Federalist majorities in Congress and in a number of state legislatures.").
31 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. In response to Hans's argument that the express
language of the Eleventh Amendment was no barrier to a suit by a citizen against his or her
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In recent cases, the Court has divided over the basis of the Hans
decision. The conservative Justices have argued that Hans stands for the
proposition that the Eleventh Amendment, despite its language, incorporates a broader, constitutionally mandated state immunity.
The opposing camp, on the other hand, has argued that there is no more a recognition of a constitutional mandate in Hans than in Justice Iredell's Chisholm
dissent.33 Instead, these Justices have suggested that the Hans decision,
which was based on the Chisholm dissent, only reaffirmed the notion that
state common-law immunity, not otherwise subsumed by the Eleventh
Amendment, should be respected by the federal courts as a matter of
comity in the absence of an act of Congress to withdraw it. 34 This view
left the door open for the argument that Congress could abrogate that
portion of the states' common-law sovereign immunity existing within the
common law but outside the express terms of the Eleventh Amendment.
Putting aside this congressional abrogation issue for the time being,35
Hans at least settled an old question by deciding that a state's immunity
barred suits against it in federal court by its own citizens. It also added
something new, namely, that this immunity extended to suits involving a
federal question as well.

own state, the Court responded:
It is true, the amendment does so read: and if there were no other reason

or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable; and then we should
have this anomalous result, that in cases arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts by its
own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of other States ....
"
Id. Compare Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1154 (Souter, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that
Hans's position would have created an anomalous situation because the Eleventh
Amendment is no bar to suits by citizens or noncitizens when a federal question is involved) with JACOBS, supra note 2, at 94 (declaring that "[i]t is unlikely that objections to
impleading a state at the original suit of a citizen of another state or of a foreigner would
have been any less vigorous if the basis for the asserted jurisdiction had been the existence of a federal question.").
32 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1130 & n.12; Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of
Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31-32, 37, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39
& n.2, 243 n.3 (1985).
33 See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying
text.
34 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1137-38, 1142 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
1154 (Souter, J., dissenting); Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 25-29 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting); County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 254 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 312-15,
317-19 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35 Hans is, at best, ambivalent on this point. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12, 18, 21.
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C. Adjusting State Sovereign Immunity After Hans: Ex parte
Young, Waiver, and Other Limitations
1. The Young Doctrine
With the State's victory in Hans, and a state immunity of such immense proportions that it seemed at odds with the Supremacy Clause,36
the pendulum began to swing the other way. 37 The major adjustment
came in the guise of the Young doctrine, announced by the Court in its
1908 decision in Exparte Young.
According to the doctrine, a suit can
be maintained against an officer of a state in order to enjoin him or her
from enforcing an unconstitutional statute or from exceeding his or her
authority. 39 The suit is deemed to be one against the officer as an indi36 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1178 (Souter, J., dissenting).
37 Actually, most of the restrictions on the Eleventh Amendment were placed
there
much earlier by Chief Justice Marshall. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 847-53 (1824) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply if the
state is not the nominal defendant, for example, when a suit is brought against a state officer on the basis of constitutionally defective authorization); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 406, 412 (1821) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit
federal appellate review of federal question cases); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 115, 139-40, 141 (1809) (declaring that the Eleventh Amendment is no impediment to a suit in which the state is not a party even when the state has a significant interest in the outcome). At the time, these restrictions were neither welcomed nor considered
necessary by many who feared a powerful federal judiciary and the erosion of state sovereignty. See generally JACOBS, supra note 2, at 75-105. In any event, the principle of
Osborn that permitted certain suits against state officers was not called upon with any
regularity or frequency until the turn of the twentieth century. See id. at 106-07.
38 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The underpinnings of the doctrine were first announced
in
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 836-37 and were developed, not always consistently, in a
long line of decisions not discussed here. See Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); Fitts
v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S.
1 (1891); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886);
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick
R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883); Louisiana
v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Board of
Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203
(1872); Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
See Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56.
Individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are
about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal
Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.
Id.; see also Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-20 (1912) (noting that governmental immunity does not protect an officer of the government from personal liability
when that officer "act[s] in excess of his authority or under an authority not validly conferred."). The rule of the Young case is narrow indeed. While the decision in Philadel-
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vidual, not as a representative of the state. 40 Of course, it may not be
easy to determine when a state officer is acting as an individual rather

than in an official capacity. 41 The Court had already made this determination decidedly easier, however, in its 1887 decision in In re Ayers42
where it held, in a rather bootstrap fashion, that
[i]f... an individual, acting under the assumed authority of a State,
as one of its officers, and under color of its laws, comes into conflict
with the superior authority of a valid law of the United States, he is
stripped of his representative character, and subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power
to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme
4
authority of the United States. 1

The injunction against a state officer can be prohibitive or affirmative," but it must be forward-looking. 45 An award of money damages
for past wrongs is thus not available under the doctrine. 46 Quizzically, it
does not matter that obeying a prospective injunction will require an offiphia Co. certainly expanded the scope of the exception, the parameters of this liberalization are not clearly defined. Thus, a narrow understanding of the Young doctrine is
plausible. Cf.John Rosenbloom, Comment, The Elusive Eleventh Amendment and the
Perimeters of Federal Power, 46 U. CoLo. L. REv. 211, 229-30, 233 n.147 (1974)
(arguing that "[tihe usefulness of the fiction of a suit against officers in their individual
capacities is confined to the narrow class of cases where either of the two requirements is
shown [i.e., unconstitutional statute or ultra vires conduct] and only prospective relief is
sought."). The Court's application of the Young doctrine thus far has not been overly
exacting, however, and relief under it is apparently available to remedy any violation of
federal law. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (suggesting that the
Young doctrine is an available remedy to any continuing violation of federal law). But cf
infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text (discussing recent efforts by the Court to constrict the Young doctrine).
40 See Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
41 See id. at 150-52 where the Court considered certain cases predating Young in
which it struggled with this distinction.
42 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
43 Id.at 507; accord Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
44 Compare Young, 209 U.S. at 148, 168 (ordering state official not to act) with
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979) (ordering state official to take future action.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974);
see also Quern, 440 U.S. at
337-38.
6 See Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Treasury Dep't, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)
(explaining that "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants."); see
also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677. Yet it is entirely possible that money damages may be
the only practical way of addressing the wrong done the complainant. See Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 256 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (declaring that "[flor people in
[complainant's] shoes, it is damages or nothing.").
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cer to expend state funds. 47 It is hard to rationalize this inconsistent
treatment48
of the consequences of direct and indirect impact on the state
treasury.
Although the Young doctrine is based upon a somewhat shaky legal
fiction,4 9 it has served reasonably well as a necessary counterbalance to
Hans's expansive interpretation of state sovereign immunity.
It is important to note, however, that the Young doctrine has been applied only
in cases implicating the Fourteenth Amendment.51 It certainly is possible
that the Court will refuse to apply the doctrine outside of this context.
Indeed, recent pronouncements of the Court are aimed at reining in
the scope of the Young doctrine generally. For example, in Seminole
Tribe, the Court indicated that it would not grant Young-type relief when
Congress has already included a specific remedy in the statute in ques-52
tion-even when the provided remedy is unavailable to the plaintiff.
Although this decision limited the universe of cases where the Young
doctrine applies, it did not alter how the doctrine is to be applied. 53 In a
subsequent opinion, however, the Court threatened to take the next step
and disrupt the application of the Young doctrine as well.
The Court granted certiorari in Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe of
Idaho54 specifically to revisit the Young issue. Although a majority of the
Court agreed that the Coeur d' Alene Tribe was not entitled to relief under the Young doctrine, the plurality could not agree on a reason. Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in sections I, II-A, and III of

47 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977); see also Edelman,
415 U.S.
at 667-68 (recognizing that "fiscal consequences [are a] necessary result of compliance
with decrees which by their terms [are] prospective in nature.").

48 See FINK & TUSHNET, supra note 14,
at 138-40.
49 See Justice Brennan's criticism of the Young fiction in Atascadero,
473 U.S. at

256-57 & nn.8-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

50 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("[Mhe availability of prospective
relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the
federal interest in assuring the supremacy of the law.").
51 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 132-43 and accompanying
text. But see Prout v.
Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 543 (1903) (arguing that the judicial power of the United States must
be available to citizens who are affected by the passage of state laws that disregard the

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment or any of the other antecedent plenary powers).

52 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996)
(explaining that

"the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability which is significantly
more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte

Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter ...
Accord Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2048 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that in Seminole Tribe, "[ti h e Court left the basic tenets of Ex parte
Young untouched .... ").
117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
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his opinion. The Justice's controversial re-interpretation of Young jurisprudence, however, appears in sections II-B, II-C, and II-D of his opinion, in which only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.
Refusing to apply the Young doctrine reflexively, 55 Justice Kennedy
noted that the Court properly should balance "the need to prevent violations of federal law" against the need to "ensure that the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains meaningful. " 56 Thus, even in the face of a
violation of federal law and a request for prospective, injunctive relief
Young if the peronly, Justice Kennedy would not grant relief under
57
ceived "affront" to state sovereignty is intolerable.
This case-by-case approach garnered the criticism of not only Justice Souter and the more liberal contingent of the Court, 58 but also a trio
of conservative Justices led by Justice O'Connor. 59 Given the deep division of the Court, it is difficult to predict what sort of influence Coeur d'
Alene will have. Justice Souter, at any rate, lamented that "the effect of
the [principal and concurring] opinions is to redefine and reduce the substance of federal subject-matter jurisdiction to vindicate federal rights. 60
2.

State Waiver of Immunity

In a rather offhand manner, the Supreme Court decided for the first
time that a state could waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit
61
in federal court in the 1883 case of Clark v. Barnard. The proposition,
although not rigorously analyzed, has been repeated often and has become entrenched as a result. 62 According to the Court, the waiver of
55 See id. at 2034 (noting that "[t]he real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment
are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and pleadings.").
56 Id.
57 Id. at 2038. See, e.g., id. at 2040-43 (observing that "navigable waters uniquely
implicate sovereign interests.").

58 See generally id. at 2048 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe principal opinion would redefine the [Young] doctrine, from a rule recognizing federal jurisdiction to
enjoin officials from violating federal law to a principle of equitable discretion as much at
odds with Young's result as with the foundational doctrine on which Young rests."). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Souter's opinion.

59 See generally id. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (declaring that "the approach
[taken in the principal opinion] unnecessarily recharacterizes and narrows much of our

Young jurisprudence."). Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2048 (1997) (Souter, J., dissent-

ing).

1 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that "[t]he immunity from suit belonging to a

State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial
power of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure
...

).

62 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) (asserting

that "[a] State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or
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state immunity must be "unequivocal. "63 A state may waive its immunity in its constitution, in a statute, or by voluntary submission to federal
court jurisdiction. 64 A state's consent to suit in its own courts, however,
is not evidence of consent to suit in federal court. 65 Nor will a state be
deemed to have consented constructively to suit in federal court, 66 although Congress may be permitted to condition a state'sparticipation in a
federal program upon waiver of that state's immunity.
If the terms of
Congress's condition and its intent that the states be subject to suit in
federal court are unmistakably clear, then a state's participation in such a
program may constitute a waiver of its immunity. 68
3. Other Limitations on State Immunity
Other limitations that had already been established by the Court
were called upon more frequently as the nation entered the twentieth
century. For example, the Court concluded that sovereign immunity did
not
extend
to political
subdivisions
of the
state. 69 And
been established
for some
time that
the Eleventh
Amendment
was itnohad
impediment
to

constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the context of a
particular federal program."); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964)
(explaining that "the immunity may of course be waived; the State's freedom from suit
without its consent does not protect it from a suit to which it has consented."). An effective waiver must be accomplished in accordance with applicable state law. See Ford
Motor Co. v. Indiana Treasury Dep't, 323 U.S. 459, 468 (1945). Thus, an unauthorized
or improperly authorized waiver, such as a purported waiver by a state officer lacking
appropriate authority to act on behalf of the state, does not bind the state. See id. at 46869.
63 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1; accord Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
673(1974).
See Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); see also supra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
65 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241; Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs.
v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 677 n.19 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Treasury Dep't, 323 U.S. 459, 465-66
(1945); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900).
66 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (finding that "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place
for it here.").
67 See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 280 (1959). Cf United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936) (finding no reason to exempt a state-run business from federal
jurisdiction). The Parden line of cases and Edelman are irreconcilable, and the Court's
attempt to distinguish the two is not altogether convincing. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at
671-74.
See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40, 246-47.
69 See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890); see, e.g.,
Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Moor v. Alameda
County, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973).
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70
federal court appellate review of cases involving a federal question.
Although most of the Eleventh Amendment exceptions crafted by the
Court were at war with each other or themselves,71 their development
and expansion gave witness to the growing realization that access to the
federal courts was needed given our increasingly national economy.72

D. Abrogation of the States' Immunity From Suit in Federal Court

Despite this judicial activity regarding the question of state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, the Court was not squarely

faced with (or, perhaps more accurately, avoided) the question of congressional abrogation of that immunity until long after Hans was decided. 7 The Court finally confronted this issue in the 1976 civil rights
7o See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406, 412 (1821); see, e.g.,
McKesson Corp. v. Florida Alcohol & Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18, 26-31 (1990).
71 For example, the Young doctrine, which has been applied only in the Fourteenth
Amendment context, entangles the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments in an insoluble
knot. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. It is axiomatic that a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state action. But the Young doctrine teaches that the
violation is deemed an act of an individual, not the state. Thus, it should not be possible
to use the Young doctrine to rectify a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982) (explaining that
"[t]here is a well-recognized irony in Ex parte Young; unconstitutional conduct by a state
officer may be 'state action' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment yet not attributable to the State for purposes of the Eleventh."); see also JACOBS, supra note 2, at 143-44
(commenting on the Fourteenth AmendmentlYoung paradox). Similarly, it is unclear how
the Eleventh Amendment can be construed as a limitation on federal court subject matter
jurisdiction and still be subject to waiver at the states' discretion. CompareEdelman, 415
U.S. at 677-78 (noting that "it has been well settled... that the Eleventh Amendment
defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be
raised in the trial court"), and supra notes 61-68 (commenting on Eleventh Amendment
immunity waiver generally), with American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18
(1951); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 382 (1902) (explaining that parties cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction on a federal court if otherwise absent). But cf. Employees v. Missouri Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294 n.10 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(reasoning that "it may be that the recognized power of States to consent to the exercise
of federal judicial power over them is anomalous in light of present-day concepts of federal jurisdiction. Yet, if this is the case, it is an anomaly that is well established as a part
of our constitutional jurisprudence." -- i.e., a page of history is worth a volume of logic).
Finally, there is no good reason why a "thoroughgoing interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment" recognizes the states as immune but not municipal subdivisions, or why either should be subject to appellate jurisdiction in federal court. See Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 256 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also FINK & TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 140;
JACOBS, supra note 2, at 13-39.

72 See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 132-33. For an interesting theory on the correlation
between the ebbs and flows of history and the changing complexion of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Orth, supra note 22, at 263-66.
73 See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475
(1987); Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985) (illustrating
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case of Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer.7 4 The Court concluded that Congress could
enact laws under the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment that permitted citizens to sue a state in federal court:75 "[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment[] and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited b the enforcement provisions of section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 Such authority, however, was not to
be assumed in a cavalier manner. Congress's intention to make the states
subject to such77 suits had to be expressed in unmistakably clear language
in the statute.
The Fitzpatrickcase did not completely answer the abrogation question. Certainly Congress's lawmaking authority is not contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment alone nor, for that matter, exclusively in those
amendments that follow the Eleventh Amendment. If, however, Article
111-as limited by the Eleventh Amendment (in the Hans sense, not in its
literal sense)--sets "forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal
court jurisdiction, " 7 then it may be argued that laws enacted pursuant to
Article I, or any of the other antecedent plenary powers, are bounded by
the Hans notion of narrow federal jurisdiction, regardless of any broader
enforcement scheme that Congress may attempt to enact. The Fourteenth
Amendment cases can be distinguished on the basis that the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, well after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal
power struck by the Constitution." 7 9 Thus, even after Fitzpatrick, it was
still possible to argue that the grants of power contained in Article I are
inherently limited by the unhappy fact that Article I was ratified before
the Eleventh Amendment. 80
how the Court avoided ruling on the abrogation issue by assuming, without deciding, that
the Rower exists).
75 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
See id. at 456; cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) (foretelling future
suits based on the Fourteenth Amendment).
76 Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
77 See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234,

240(1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
79 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996). Justice Brennan
criti-

cized this distinction, noting that "the lower courts have rightly concluded that it makes
no sense to conceive of § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] as somehow being an
'ultraplenary' grant of authority." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 17.
go In a bankruptcy case from the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the court made the
curious argument that laws enacted pursuant to the authority of Article I can be enforced

against the states by riding on the coattails of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mather v.
Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419,

426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995). The court advanced the novel proposition that the Bankruptcy Code, though enacted pursuant to the Article I Bankruptcy Clause, is nonetheless
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Although not directly deciding whether Congress could abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity in some context other than the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court came tantalizingly close to reaching this decision
in Parden v. Terminal Railway Co. 8 ' Parden raised the issue of whether
Congress could enact a law under the authority of the Commerce Clause
that expressly subjected the states to suit in federal court.82 A slim majority, led by Justice Brennan, decided the case on at least two (and more
likely three) alternate grounds that are sewn together as if components of
one argument:
Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA [Federal Employers' Liability Act], necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by
that Act [the constructive waiver ground]. By adopting and ratifying
the Commerce Clause, the States empowered Congress to create such
a right of action against interstate railroads [the ratification ground];
by enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power, Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon
amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be
taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have3 consented to
suit [the waiver as a condition of participation ground].,

Although Parden is generally thought of as a waiver case, Justice
states surrendered aportion of their

Brennan advanced the theory that the

sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution.8
By so doing,
the Justice argued, the states empowered Congress to create rights of ac-

enforced through the power granted to Congress in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). If Congress
has the authority to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,
the argument goes, then it can do so in the context of any federal law that relies on that
Amendment for its enforcement. See Southern Star, 190 B.R. at 425-26. The bankruptcy court's expansive description of the scope of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would essentially bring every federal law under its umbrella, thereby permitting
Congress to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in the context of any federal law
whenever it pleased. It is doubtful that the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment is so
elastic.
81 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
82 See id. at 184, 187, 189-90.
83 Id. at 192. It is important to note the distinction between the outright authority to
abrogate state immunity as a consequence of ratification, and the notion that Congress can
condition state participation within a federal sphere upon the state's waiver of immunity.
The distinction is not carefully drawn in Parden, but it may be relevant after Seminole
Tribe. See infra Section IV.B.2.
84 See Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-92; accord United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175,
184 (1936) (asserting that "[tlhe sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to
the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution.").
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tion against them in the context of the Commerce Clause.8 5 It is this

premise that served as the foundation for the Court's next step.
That step was taken by the Court in 1989 when it announced its decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 7 When asked if Congress

could create a cause of action for money damages against the states in the
context of an environmental clean-up statute enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, a badly fractured plurality answered in the affirmative.88 Justice Brennan authored an opinion and entered the judgment of
the Court. 89 Citing Parden as laying the "firm foundation" for the
Court's conclusion, Justice Brennan once again espoused the theory that

the states surrendered their sovereign immunity concerning matters arising under the Commerce Clause when they ratified the Constitution.9"
The Eleventh Amendment, Justice Brennan argued, did not give that immunity back. 9 1
85 See Parden, 377 U.S. at 192-93.

Justice Brennan would invoke the ratification

ground several times more but, as the theory lost favor with the rest of the Court, only in
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (plurality opinion); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 299, 300 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 Parden very nearly did not last that long. In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation, the Court overruled Parden "[tlo the extent that [it] is inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by
Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language .... " 483 U.S. 468, 478
(1987). The power to abrogate--the ratification ground--was left undisturbed. Also left
undisturbed was the waiver as a condition of participation ground. See id. at 478 n.8
(stating that "we have no occasion in this case to consider the validity of the additional
holding in Parden, that Congress has the power to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause to the extent that the States are engaged in
interstate commerce.").
87 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
88 See id. at 5.
89 Although the judgment commanded a majority due to the swing vote of
Justice

White, no single rationale, including Justice Brennan's, received more than four votes.
See id.
90 See id. at 14; see also id. at 22 (concluding that "in approving the commerce
power, the States consented to suits against them based on congressionally created causes
of action.").
91 See id. at 18 (explaining that "[tihe language of the Eleventh Amendment gives us
no hint that it limits congressional authority; it refers only to 'the judicial power' and
forbids 'constru[ing]' that power to extend to the enumerated suits---language plainly intended to rein in the Judiciary, not Congress.") In an interesting concurrence, Justice
Stevens agreed that Congress could abrogate state immunity but not in contravention of
the express language of the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 23-24 (Stevens, J., concurring). In other words, Justice Stevens implied that suits (even federal question suits) between the states and noncitizens are forever out of the reach of federal courts because a
statute can never overrule the express provisions of the Constitution. Justice Stevens
would return to this theme in his Seminole Tribe dissent. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1141-42 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). State immunity from suits not
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In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment goes "beyond its precise terms" and
includes the very notion of sovereign immunity as understood by the
Framers at the time of ratification.9 Justice Scalia put little stock in Justice Brennan's consent by ratification theory: "The suggestion that [state
ratification of the Constitution] is the kind of consent our cases had in
mind when reciting the familiar phrase, 'the States may not be sued without their consent,' does not warrant response." 93 Finally, Justice Scalia
asserted that the limitations placed on Article III by the Eleventh
Amendment would be meaningless if Congress could exceed them merely
by enacting laws under the Commerce Clause. 94 That, the Justice concluded, "is not the regime the Constitution establishes. "95
III. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

A.

Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code and Hoffman v.
Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance

Congress intended to make states and other governmental entities
subject to suit in the bankruptcy court through section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code. 96 At the time the Code was first enacted, section 106 read
as follows:
(a) A governmental unit9 7 is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that
is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence out of which such governmental unit's claim arose.
(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a
governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is
property of the estate.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and
notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity-

within the narrow scope of the express language of the Eleventh Amendment, however, is
respected only as a matter of comity, the Justice argued, and within the confines of that
penumbral immunity, "it [is] readily apparent that congressional abrogation is entirely
appropriate." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 27, 28.
See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31-33 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in
Id.at
39.
94 See id. at 40.
95Id.
96 See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
97 A "governmental unit" includes the United States as well as the individual
states,
commonwealths, and their departments, agents, and instrumentalities. See 11 U.S.C. §
101(27) (1994).
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(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor", "entity", or
"governmental unit" applies to governmental units; and

(2) a determination by the court of an
9 issue arising under such a
provision binds governmental units. 9

Subsections (a) and (b) are enigmatic. They are commonly referred
to as "waivers" of sovereign immunity, compared with subsection (c),
which has been called an "abrogation" of sovereign immunity. 99 And

yet, the very nature of a waiver assumes a conscious act by the waiving
party. It is perhaps more accurate to think of subsections (a) and (b) as a
codification of the type of conduct by a governmental entity that will be
construed by a court as a waiver of that entity's immunity.1 0° In any
event, these subsections unanimously had been held to pass constitutional
muster. 10 1
Subsection (c) was likewise thought to pass constitutional muster.
At the time the Code was enacted, the Court had not yet ruled out congressional abrogation of state immunity, but rather, required only that it
be done in an unmistakably clear fashion. Certainly Congress thought
section 106(c) clear enough to support an affirmative, monetary award
against a state:
The provision indicates that the use of the term "creditor," "entity,"
or "governmental unit" in title 11 applies to governmental units
notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity and that an order of the court binds governmental units. The provision is included
to comply with the requirement in case law that an express waiver of
sovereign immunity is required in order to be effective....
98 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (amended 1994). Even this first enacted
version of section
106 did not represent the first incarnation of the immunity waiver. Several proposed
versions were considered before this version. These varied widely from an absolute abrogation of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy, to a very narrow waiver that was only operative if the state filed a proof of claim. For a complete history of the early stages of the
evolution of section 106, see Gillman v. Board of Trustees (In re T & D Management
Co.k 40 B.R. 781, 784-87 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984).
See Hoffman v. Connecticut Income Maintenance Dep't, 492 U.S. 96, 101-02, 104
(1989).
100 Viewed in this way, subsections (a) and (b) somewhat resemble the conditional
waiver introduced in Parden. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. Due to the
conservative Justices' current control of the Court, it is not clear whether Congress will
be permitted to condition participation in a federal sphere on a state's waiver of its immunity. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42-44 & n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (voicing skepticism that conditioning participation in a federal program on the waiver of immunity is any different than an unconstitutional abrogation of immunity); see also infra Section IV.B.2.
101 See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992); In re Merchants
Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 1995), remanded andjudgment vacated on other
grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1411 (1996); WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
840 F.2d 996, 1003 (lst Cir. 1988).
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[S]ubsection (c) is not limited to [court actions concerning a debtor's
tax liability], but permits the bankruptcy court to bind governmental
units on other matters as well. For example, section 106(c) permits a
trustee or debtor in possession to assert avoiding powers under title 11
against a governmental unit; contrary language in the House report to
H.R. 8200 is thereby overruled.10

Unfortunately, subsection (c) was not drafted as clearly as it might
have been. 10 3 Unlike subsections (a) and (b), subsection (c) made no reference to a "claim" or other term suggesting affirmative relief, thereby
leaving the door open for the argument that the subsection did not sanction monetary relief from governmental entities.1 04 Despite the availability of the argument, and Supreme Court cases demanding the utmost
clarity from Congress when it chooses to abrogate state immunity, 10 5
there was near unanimity among the lower courts that section 106(c)
permitted the trustee to sue the state in bankruptcy court for affirmative,
monetary relief. 106 In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance,10 7 however, the District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Second Circuit, and eventually, the Supreme Court all bucked
this trend and held that section 106(c) did not permit an individual to sue
a nonconsenting state for money damages in bankruptcy court.10
The Hoffian Court was unable to agree on a rationale for its judgment. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion concluding that the language of section 106(c) did not contain
an unmistakably clear abrogation of state sovereign immunity.1 9 Point102 124 CONG. REc. 32,394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124
CONG. REC.
33,993 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see also Frank R. Kennedy, Automatic
SAW Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MIcH. J.L. REFoRM 1, 29 & n.120 (1978).
See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 34 (complaining that "[n]ext to these models of
clarity [subsections (a) and (b)] stands subsection (c).").
104 See, e.g., Inslaw, Inc. v. United States (In re Inslaw, Inc.), 76 B.R. 224, 234
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1987) (representing an early, and unsuccessful, attempt by a governmen-

tal entity to argue that section 106(c) permitted injunctive relief only).

105 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
106 See McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.),
812
F.2d 311, 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1987); Rhode Island Ambulance Servs., Inc. v. Begin (In re
Rhode Island Ambulance Servs., Inc.), 92 B.R. 4, 6-7 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988); see also
Steven M. Richman, More Equal Than Others: State Sovereign Immunity Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 21 RUTGFm L.J. 603, 609-17 (1990); supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
107 72 B.R. 997 (D. Conn. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of
Income Maintenance (In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc.), 850 F.2d 50, 57 (2d
Cir. 1988), affid, 492 U.S. 96, 104 (1989).
108 See Hoffman, 72 B.R. at 1002. The district court's decision was unfairly criticized
as being "rather bizarre." See Inslaw, 76 B.R. at 236 n.2 5 . Of course, the district court
was vindicated by the Supreme Court's eventual affirmance.
109 See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 104.
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ing to the narrow waivers of subsections (a) and (b) by comparison, Justice White thought the wide-open language of subsection (c) "more indicative of declaratory and injunctive relief than of monetary recovery." 110 Justice White would not look to the legislative history, which
clearly spelled out a congressional intent at odds with his opinion. The
Justice explained his refusal as a "lose/lose" situation for a sloppy Congress:11 1 "If congressional intent is unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute, reliance on committee reports and floor statements will be
unnecessary, and if not, Atascadero will not be satisfied." 1 2 By deciding the case on the clarity of abrogation issue, the Court avoided the
question of whether Congress had the authority to abrogate state immunity under its bankruptcy power.1 3 Nonetheless, the authority issue was
lurking not far behind as the concurring
opinions and a dissent each ad4
vanced views on that subject.1
Not pleased with the Supreme Court's refusal to interpret section
106 in conformity with its intent, Congress rewrote section 106 in 1994
so that there could be no doubt that sovereign immunity was unequivocally abrogated through the amended subsection (c) (now, section
106(a)):
This section would effectively overrule two Supreme Court
cases that have held that the States and Federal Government are not
110 Id. at 102. Justice White explained that:
We believe that § 106(c)(2) operates as a further limitation on the applicability of § 106(c), narrowing the type of relief to which the section applies.

Section 106(c)(2) is joined with subsection (c)(1) by the conjunction "and."
It provides that a "determination" by the bankruptcy court of an "issue"
"binds governmental units." This language differs significantly from the

wording of §§ 106(a) and (b), both of which use the word "claim," defined
in the Bankruptcy Code as including a "right to payment." Nothing in §

106(c) provides a similar express authorization for monetary recovery from
the States.
Id.
(citation omitted).
11 But see United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 45-46 & n.14 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court's fanatical insistence on clarity
"burdens the Congress with unnecessary reenactments of provisions that were already
plain enough when read literally.").
112 Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 104 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234

(1985)).
113 See id. at 104. A few years later, the Court likewise decided that the abrogation
in
section 106(c) did not clearly permit actions for monetary damages against the federal
government either. See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 39.
114 See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "I agree
with Justice Scalia that Congress may not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting a statute under the Bankruptcy Clause.... ."); id. at 105 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (expressing the same opinion); id. at 111 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(concluding that Congress has the authority to abrogate state immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause just as it does under the Commerce Clause).
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deemed to have waived their sovereign immunity by virtue of enacting
section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. In enacting section 106(c),
Congress intended to make provisions of title 11 that encompassed the
words "creditor," "entity, " or "governmental unit" applicableto the
States. Congress also intended to make the States subject to a money
judgment. But the Supreme Court in Hoffman... held that even if
the State did not file a claim, the trustee in bankruptcy may not recover a money judgment from the State notwithstanding section
106(c) ....

This amendment expressly provides for a waiver of sovereign
immunity by governmental units with respect to monetary recoveries
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. It is the Committee's intent to make section 106 conform to the Congressional intent of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 waving the sovereifn immunity of
the States and the Federal Government in this regard. 1 5

The new section 106 now reads as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth
in this section with respect to the following...
(1) [60 Bankruptcy Code sections, including sections 544, 547,
and 548]
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to the application of such sections to governmental units.
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order,
process, or judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, including an order or judgment awarding
a money recovery ....
(b) A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is
deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim
against such governmental unit that is property of the estate and arose
out of the same transaction or occurrence out of which the claim of
such governmental unit arose.
(c) Notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity by a governmental unit, there shall be offset against a claim or interest of a
governmental unit any' claim against such governmental unit that is
property of the estate.
It is difficult to imagine a clearer, more unequivocal expression of
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court would

115

124 CONG. REC. H10,766 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (emphasis added) (citation

omitted) (analysis of the Reform Act inserted into the Congressional Record by Rep.
Brooks).
116 11 U.S.C. §106 (1994).
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no longer have this side issue upon which to strike down the statute. The
authorization question, at last, would be joined.
B.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida

With the retirement of four of the five Justices making up the Union
Gas plurality and a conservative core of Justices left largely intact, there
would be no holding back the expansive view of the Eleventh Amendment. And soon enough, an opportunity to make that view the law presented itself in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.117 Although the case did not
involve a statute enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause, it sounded
the death knell for section 106(a) as it pertains to the states just as surely
as if the case addressed that very provision.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. The statute in question
was the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act enacted by Congress pursuant to
the Indian Commerce Clause of Article 1.118 After acknowledging that
the Act contained an unequivocal abrogation of state immunity,"' and
that "no principled distinction" could be made between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Commerce Clause, which was the subject of Union
Gas,12 the Court recognized that it would either have to uphold the Act
under the reasoning of Union Gas or overrule that case. It chose the latter, concluding that "Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should
be, and now is, overruled." 121 Not surprisingly, the majority based its
decision on an expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment: "'[W]e
have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what
it says, but for the presupposition.., which it confirms.'"1 22 Citing to
Hans, the Court argued that federal jurisdiction over nonconsenting states
was never contemplated by the Founding Fathers and that the states did
not surrender their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution.2 The Court's conclusion almost reads as if it were directed at
section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the
suit is an area ...that is under the exclusive control of the Federal

117

11

116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
See id.
at 1119.

119 See id.at 1123-24.
120 See id.at 1127.
121Id. at 1128.
122 Id. at 1122 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779

(1991)); see also id. at 1129-30.
123

See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122-23.
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Government. Even when the Constitutionvests in Congress complete
lawmaking authority over a particulararea, the Eleventh Amendment
prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting states. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the
judicialpower under Article IlI, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdic12 4
tion.

The Court did not rest here, however, but further eroded existing
limitations on the Eleventh Amendment by restricting the application of
the Young doctrine. 125 Noting that Congress had provided a specially
tailored and narrow remedy in the Gaming Act (a remedy that the Court
emasculated in the first half of its opinion), the Court refused to supple-

ment those remedies with judicially created ones. 126 Ironically, at two
separate places in the majority's opinion, the Court cited to Young as a
remedy still
available to those who wish to enforce federal law against
127

the states.
The ramifications of this decision were not lost on Justice Stevens
who noted in his dissent that because "federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under [many] federal laws, the majority's
conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being sued
under them in federal court suggests that persons harmed by state violations of federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws have no remedy. 128 Both Justices Stevens and Souter filed long dissenting opinions
124 Id. at 1131-32 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
125 See id. at 1132-33; see also supra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
12 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33. Recognizing that the Young
doctrine is
instrumental to the balancing of the sometimes competing interests of the states and the
federal government, Justice Souter quite fairly wondered why the majority did not apply
"the rule recognized in our previous cases, which have insisted on a clear statement before assuming a congressional purpose to 'affec[t] the federal balance.'" Id. at 1180-81
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
127 See id. at 1131 nn.14, 16.
128 Id. at 1134 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The effect of the Seminole Tribe decision on federal copyright and antitrust law is of a different nature than its
effect on the Bankruptcy Code because the scope of the abrogation of state immunity in
the bankruptcy context is unlike the abrogation under those other statutory schemes. The
Bankruptcy Code is not an insular, substantive federal law in the same way as the copyright and antitrust statutes. Rather, it gives rise to an environment of sorts within which
not only Bankruptcy Code causes of action, but also other federal law and state law
causes of action, are collected and litigated before a federal bankruptcy judge. Prior to
Seminole Tribe, section 106(a) purported to eliminate state sovereign immunity not just to
Bankruptcy Code causes of action or even to other federal causes of action, but to all actions that could be brought in bankruptcy court. Thus, in bankruptcy, states lost their
immunity from suit on state law causes of action that, outside of bankruptcy, they may
well have enjoyed. Depending on a state's local immunity policy, Seminole Tribe can be
defended as correcting this disparity. But see infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text
(discussing widespread movement among the states to abolish their own immunity in their

1997]

STATE IMMUNITY IN BANKRUPTCY

53

in which each reviewed the political and legal climate at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution and the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and each concluded, rather convincingly, that the majority's theory
that the Eleventh Amendment incorporates some ethereal and ex [ansive
common law sovereign immunity is without historical precedent.
Although not directly addressing section 106 of the Bankruptcy
Code, it seems plain enough that section 106(a) cannot be reconciled with
have
the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe. Indeed, those few cases that
130
conclusion.
foregone
this
acknowledged
have
issue
the
considered

own courts). More than just state law causes of action are affected, of course. To the
extent that Seminole Tribe recognizes state immunity from Bankruptcy Code causes of
action, the repercussions of the case more closely resemble those that follow from its
apip1ication to the laws of copyright and antitrust.
See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1146-78
(Souter, J., dissenting); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally JACOBS, supra note 2, at 1-40, 15064. The majority chided Justice Souter for his lengthy and in-depth historical analysis,
asserting that his "undocumented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision in Hans is a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1130. Yet, when that "traditional method of adjudication" sustains legal theories that are premised on a mistaken understanding of history, the
magrity's methodology hardly seems preferable to the dissent's.
See Light v. California (In re Light), 87 F.3d 1320, 1996 WL 341112, at *1-2 (9th
Cir. June 20, 1996) (unpublished disposition) ("Notwithstanding this clear textual waiver
of the States' sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court's recent decision, Seminole
Tribe[,j... forecloses any argument that §106 of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates the
States' sovereign immunity."); accordIn re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 230 (D.P.R. 1996);
Sparkman v. Florida Dep't of Revenue (In re York Hannover Devs., Inc.), 201 B.R. 137,
140-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996); Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 200 B.R. 282, 285-86
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 199 B.R. 129, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 204 B.R. 132, 138
(E.D. Pa. 1997); cf., Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern (In re Merchants Grain, Inc.), 116 S. Ct. 1411 (1996), remanding and vacating judgment, In re
Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 1995) (vacating the Seventh Circuit's
judgment that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity upon the authority of the
Bankruptcy Clause and remanding back to the circuit for further consideration in light of
Seminole Tribe).
Commentators have already begun predicting which Bankruptcy Code provisions
and powers will be unsettled by Seminole Tribe. See Mark Browning & Patricia L. Barsalou, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: A Closer Look, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10,
38 (1996) (predicting new limitations on the bankruptcy courts' ability to fix tax liability
under section 505 and to sell assets free and clear of a state's lien under section 363); see
also Stephen W. Sather, et al., Borrowing From the Taxpayer: State and Local Tax
Claims In Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 201, 231 (1996) (questioning
whether the bankruptcy courts will be able to subordinate state claims under section
510(c) after Seminole Tribe).
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IV. RESPONSES To SEMINOLE TRIBE

A. The Propriety of Efforts to Circumvent Seminole Tribe in
Bankruptcy
Certainly the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,
and the Seminole Tribe decision specifically, are not above criticism.
Although one might expect some countermeasure aimed at neutralizing
the effect of Seminole Tribe in bankruptcy, it is proper to decide initially
whether, as a normative matter, it is appropriate to attempt to circumvent
Seminole Tribe only in bankruptcy and not in other areas of the law. In
other words, should bankruptcy policy be concerned with correcting
constitutional wrong turns taken by the Supreme Court?
Professor, and now Dean, Thomas Jackson has explored this issue
in his important work on bankruptcy's "few and elegant," but nonetheless limited, principles. 131 Jackson argues that bankruptcy law is intended to address the common pool problem 132 by creating a collective
process whereby the going concern premium of the debtor's assets may
be preserved for the benefit of the creditors as a group. 133 "The single
most fruitful way to think about bankruptcy is to see it as ameliorating a
common pool problem created by a system of individual creditor reme131 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW vii (1986).
132

A common pool problem exists when a group of similarly situated parties with en-

titlements to an inadequate resource race against one another to satisfy their own entitle-

ments first even though they are better off as a group if they proceed in a cooperative
fashion. Such a circumstance represents a classic prisoner's dilemma. See generally
WIJAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992). It is easy to see how a group of
creditors all proceeding against a debtor and its limited assets may be viewed as giving
rise to a common pool problem. Jackson provides an accessible description of the common pool problem and its application to an insolvent debtor. See JACKSON, supra note
131, at 10-17.
See JACKSON, supra note 131, at 25 (asserting that "everyone seems to [accept the
view] that bankruptcy law. . . exists as a response to a common pool problem."); see
also id. at 7-17, 209-10. Despite Jackson's assertion to the contrary, which was offered
at a time when the assertion might have been easier to defend, recent scholarship has
called into question the common pool justification of bankruptcy. See Barry E. Adler,
Financialand Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv.
311, 313-14 (1993) (arguing that parties can more efficiently address the common pool
problem in their contracts). Compare JACKSON, supra note 131, at 7 (explaining that
"[blankruptcy law and policy have been subject to long-standing debate. This debate is
not so much about whether bankruptcy law should exist at all but about how much it
should do.") (emphasis added), with Adler, supra, at 313-14, Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050 (1992), and
James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and
the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27, 72-76 (1991)
(questioning the need or desirability of a corporate reorganization procedure in the bankruptcy law).
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dies."1 34 Accordingly, special bankruptcy rules are justified only when
they are necessary to convert the individual remedy race to a collective
process.135 On the other hand, bankruptcy should not be concerned with
questions of relative entitlement that have nothing to do with the common
pool problem. Instead, distribution should be governed by applicable
nonbankruptcy (often state) law. 136 If rules found only in bankruptcy law
permit a creditor to elevate the priority of its claim above the level it
would enjoy under a nonbankruptcy regime, such an arbitrage would
create a perverse incentive to institute a bankruptcy proceeding for reasons other than the collective good.1 37 Thus, Jackson argues that a rule
of law, even if misguided, should be respected in bankruptcy unless it
otherwise interferes with the collective remedy. 138 If the rule is to be
corrected at all, it should be amended across the board in deference to
nonbankruptcy policy. 139 Trying to fix the problem only in bankruptcy

invites self-serving 40
creditor conduct--the very problem that bankruptcy

law seeks to avoid. 1

Turning to the Seminole Tribe decision, it is readily apparent that
the case cannot be legislatively overruled. Short of a constitutional
amendment--or perhaps, a reconstitution of the Supreme Court--there is
no way to overrule the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment

134

See JACKSON, supra note 131, at 16-17.

135 See id. at 21-28, 68-74, 125-28.

136 See id. at 21-67.
137 This theme pervades Jackson's book:

mhe

establishment of new entitlements in bankruptcy conflicts with the
collectivization goal. Such changes create incentives for particular holders
of rights in assets to resort to bankruptcy in order to gain for themselves
the advantages of those changes, even when a bankruptcy proceeding
would not be in the collective interest of the investor group. These incen-

tives are predictable and counterproductive because they reintroduce the
fundamental problem that bankruptcy law is designed to solve: individual
self-interest undermining the interests of the group. These changes are
better made generally instead of in bankruptcy only.
Id. at 21; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 953, 958 (1981) (declaring that "[e]very rule that differs from state law will provide
to someone relative advantage in bankruptcy over their [sic] position outside bank73t~rcy.").
See JACKSON, supra note 131, at 26 (asserting that "[e]ven though a nonbankruptcy
rule may suffer from infirmities such as unfairness or inefficiency, if the nonbankruptcy
rule does not undermine the advantages of a collective proceeding relative to the individual remedies that exist given those entitlements, imposing a different bankruptcy rule is a
second-best and perhaps a counterproductive solution.").
139 See id. at 25-27 & n.10; see also supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140 See JACKSON, supra note 131, at 25-27 & n.10; see also supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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either inside or outside of bankruptcy law. 14 Moreover, a rule that applies both inside and outside of bankruptcy law seems to offer no perverse incentive to institute a bankruptcy procedure for reasons other than
the collective good. For two reasons, however, this is not the case in the
context of sovereign immunity and bankruptcy law. First, both the legislature and the courts-although unable to overrule Seminole Tribe-may
be able to limit the repercussions of the case in the bankruptcy context.
Such efforts to minimize the repercussions of the case likewise might
create an improper incentive to file bankruptcy. The second concern is
that the rule of Seminole Tribe, even if applied identically both inside and
outside of bankruptcy law, may lead to inconsistent results because of the
different ways that a state's immunity operates in federal court versus
state court. In other words, by not tweaking the rule of Seminole Tribe
in the bankruptcy context, a perverse incentive to file bankruptcy petitions may be permitted to continue. Thus, we must analyze both the rule
of Seminole Tribe and section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code (as initially
contemplated by Congress) in order to see which one creates the perverse
incentive and which one remedies it.
If section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code duplicates the operation and
limits of state immunity in state law bankruptcy analogues-i.e., liquidations, stock transfers or assignments for the benefit of creditors--then efforts to circumvent Seminole Tribe in bankruptcy law are justifiable.
This argument provides a slight twist to Jackson's analysis, but is necessitated by the role of sovereign immunity in our dual system of federalism. Jackson argues that special bankruptcy rules that differ from
state rules should be avoided in most cases. 142 Conversely, I suggest that
special rules in bankruptcy may be necessary to mimic the process outside of bankruptcy. When bankruptcy law contains "harmful" special
rules referred to by Jackson, or lacks "beneficial" special rules defended
here, the end result is the same: A creditor (in my example, the state) is
even if
given a perverse incentive to favor a bankruptcy proceeding
143
creditors, as a group, are not better served as a result.
141

Jackson recognizes that in order to overrule unfair or inefficient rules, it is first

necessary to determine whether "Congress has such power under the Constitution."
JACKSON, supra note 131, at 27 n.13.
142 See supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
143 It is perhaps uncommon (even unheard of) for a state to commence, or participate
in, the commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, although there is nothing
in the Bankruptcy Code to prevent a state from doing so. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(15)
(1994) (defining "entity" to include governmental units); 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1994)
(stating that an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding may be commenced when three or
more "entities" file a petition); cf. In re Butcher, 32 B.R. 572, 573-74 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1983) (acknowledging that a governmental unit may constitute an "entity" for purposes of filing an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)). It is

1997]

STATE IMMUNITY IN BANKRUPTCY

57

Interestingly enough, the abrogation of immunity in section 106 op-

erates similarly to the law of many local jurisdictions. Despite the recent
rash of Supreme Court decisions reaffirming and expanding state immu-

nity, the trend among the states themselves has been to limit or even
abolish state immunity in their own courts. 44 This is particularly true
for tort claims, which are likely to constitute a significantpercentage of
the claims held by individual debtors against the states. 14 If a debtor
would be permitted to sue its state outside of bankruptcy, then the same
result should follow in bankruptcy. 146
There appears to be another compelling justification for a section
106-type provision in bankruptcy law. Any solution to the common pool
important to note that even if the state is not responsible for commencing the bankruptcy
proceeding, its immunity will nonetheless interfere with the collectivization goal of bankruptcy by preventing the realization of an asset--the debtor's claim against the state--to
the detriment of the creditor body as a whole.
144 "That the sentiment against [sovereign immunity] is widespread is evidenced by
both national and state legislation waiving immunity from suit and enlarging governmental
liability." JACOBS, supra note 2, at 164; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1044-46, 1055 (5th ed. 1984); BERNARD
SCHWARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 830 (4th ed. 1994). Chief Justice Jay undoubtedly
would have been pleased with this development: "I wish the state of society was so far
improved, and the science of Government advanced to such a degree of perfection, as
that the whole nation could in the peaceable course of law, be compelled to do justice,
and be sued by individual citizens." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478
(1793).
Despite the growing trend among the states to limit or abolish their immunity, the
condition of that immunity undoubtedly will vary from state to state. This raises an interesting question: How should a bankruptcy rule duplicate this state of affairs? A default
rule that approximates the condition of state immunity in most jurisdictions may be acceptable if the cost of its discrepancies is not as great as the cost of devising and applying
a more exact rule. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 131, at 130, 147 (commenting generally on
rules of administrative convenience). A federal rule that calls for the application of the
applicable state rule is also an option. Although the Constitution's proscription against
nonuniform bankruptcy law may seem to foreclose the latter, the Supreme Court has rejected such a strict interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 4; see also Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188-90 (1902); Eisenberg,
supra note 137, at 955.
5 See KEETON Er AL., supra note 144, at 1055 (declaring that "[t]he most striking
feature of the tort law of governmental entities today is that the immunities, once almost
total have been largely abolished or severely restricted at almost all levels .... ").
1Z? The fact that the state is likely to face both state and federal causes of action in
bankruptcy does not change the analysis. Outside of bankruptcy, the states are likely to
be amenable to both types of suit as well--state causes of action because of the growing
trend among the states to abolish their immunity in their own courts, and federal causes of
action because, regardless of local immunity policy, the Supremacy Clause and a carefully drawn federal statute require as much. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) (illustrating that the Supremacy Clause may overcome state immunity); infra notes 199-216 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that the states may be sued in their own courts on federal causes of action even if
they would be immune from such suits in federal court).
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problem may require it. As noted above, Jackson's bankruptcy paradigm
countenances special rules in bankruptcy if they are necessary to convert
a system of individual remedy to a collective process. 147 Thus, the automatic stay can be justified because it bars individual action while the
collective remedy is implemented.'" Quite apart from individual state
immunity policy, section 106 as originally contemplated by Congress
may have been justified on the ground that it permitted enforcement of
the stay against governmental entities in bankruptcy court in the same
way that section 362 may be enforced against all other creditors. 149 Indeed, one of the most troubling repercussions of the Seminole Tribe decision is that there may now be no way of enforcing the automatic stay
against the states.
The rule of Seminole Tribe, then, actually leaves the states better off
inside of bankruptcy than outside of it. This situation is fraught with the
perverse incentive problem noted by Jackson and justifies attempts to circumvent the rule inside bankruptcy.
B.

Measures Requiring Legislative Intervention

Because Seminole Tribe concludes that the Eleventh Amendment
"constitutionalized" state sovereign immunity, and effectively put it out
of the reach of the antecedent plenary powers of Congress, there is no
direct legislative solution to the section 106 dilemma. 15U Indirect legislative solutions do not appear to be more promising.
1. Authorizing the Federal Government To Sue the States On
Behalf of the Debtor
Congress could attempt to exploit the fact that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits against the states by the United States even
See supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
14 See JACKSON, supra note 131, at 28, 151-52, 157-66, 182-83.
149 Of course, section 106 purports to do a great deal more than permit the enforce147

ment of the stay against the states. As argued above, however, these additional consequences may have been defensible as well. See supra notes 142-146 and accompanying

text.
150 Justice Stevens explained in dissent:

[A]fter deciding that Congress had not made sufficiently explicit its inten-

tion to withdraw the state sovereign immunity defense in certain bankruptcy actions, Congress understandably concluded that it could correct the
confusion by amending the relevant statute to make its intentions to override such a defense unmistakably clear. Congress will no doubt be surprised to learn that its exercise in legislative clarification, which it undertook for our benefit, was for naught because the Constitution makes it so.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1140 n.12 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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in the absence of state consent.
52

15

59

If, for example, an agency of the fed-

eral government' were given concomitant standing with the debtor to
prosecute the debtor's claims
against the state, the Eleventh Amendment
53
obstacle might be avoided.1

A similar proposal, not specifically addressing the bankruptcy situation, was suggested by Jonathan Siegel in his article on Congress's

authority to abrogate sovereign immunity.' 54 Siegel's argument proceeds
in three steps, starting from the "settled proposition" that the states are
not immune from suits by the United States, 155 moving to suits against
the states by individuals in the name of the United States, 156 and arriving

at the expedient of suits against the states by individuals in their own
names.

For the purposes of this article, discussion can be limited to

58
the initial phase of Siegel's argument. 1

151This frequently stated principle of constitutional law is beyond question.
See
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) (asserting that "[t]he submission to judicial solution of controversies arising between [the states and the United States], 'each
sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect
to the objects committed to the other,' ... but both subject to the supreme law of the
land, does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty." (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819))); accord West Virginia v. United States,
479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987) (explaining that "States have no sovereign immunity as against
the Federal Government .

. .

."); Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S.

279, 286 (1973) (declaring that "suits by the United States against a State are not barred
by the Constitution."); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) (finding
that "nothing in this or any other provision of the Constitution prevents or has ever been
seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United States.").
152 The Office of the United States Trustee, a branch of the Department of Justice,
provides one example. Such an adversarial role, however, would seem inconsistent with
the tenor of the U.S. Trustee's general duty of oversight. See 28 U.S.C. §586(a) (1994)
(listing duties of United States Trustees).
Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested something like this in Seminole Tribe. See
Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1131 n.14 (proffering that "the Federal Government can
brin15# suit in federal court against a State. . . .") (citations omitted).
See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEx. L. REv. 539, 556-64 (1995). Although Siegel's paper was
written prior to Seminole Tribe, he anticipated the Court's attack on Congress's power to
abrogate state immunity, taking his cue from Justice Scalia's dissent in Union Gas. See
id. at 539-42, 549-50.
155 See id. at 552-56 (noting that the states enjoy no immunity from suits by
the United
States).
156 See id. at 556-64 (describing suits against states by individuals in the name
of the
United States, called qui tam actions).
157 See id. at 564-69 (explaining thesis that suits against states by individuals
in their
own names should be permitted).
158 Siegel's reason for continuing on from the first step is based on the very sensible
observation that relying on the federal government to vindicate individual rights under the
many federal statutory schemes would be prohibitively expensive, and therefore, unlikely.
See id. at 556 & n.100. To be sure, a process by which a bankruptcy debtor could
prosecute its own causes of action against the states despite Seminole Tribe would be far
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Using the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act 5 9 to illustrate,
Siegel argues that Congress could authorize the United States to sue any
state for violation of the Act, collect and pay into the treasury a penalty
equal to the amount the wronged veteran could have recovered but for
state immunity from suit, and then authorize an appropriation from the
treasury to be paid to that veteran equal to the amount recovered by the
United States.
Much earlier, New Hampshire and New York unsuccessfully at161
tempted to sidestep the Eleventh Amendment in a similar manner.
Both states enacted laws permitting their citizens to "assign" individual
claims against sister states to New Hampshire or New York respectively,
for collection. 162 The citizens were required to pay all costs of collection, received the full amount of any recovery, and in the case of New
3 The
Hampshire's
law, a could
authorize
a compromise
the claim.16
Court "without
doubt"
recognized
that the of
plaintiff
states were
superior to a system that relies on the United States Trustee or another federal agency to
accomplish the same thing. Yet, the United States Trustee's significant participation in
bankruptcy cases under the existing statutory scheme makes the burden of additional responsibilities easier to shoulder. In any event, Siegel's third step is probably constitutionally infirm notwithstanding its practical appeal:
[Riespondents assert that [the federal statute at issue] represents not an abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity, but rather a delegation... of
the Federal Government's exemption from state sovereign immunity. We
doubt, to begin with, that that sovereign exemption can be delegated--even
if one limits the permissibility of delegation... to persons on whose behalf the United States itself might sue. The consent, "inherent in the convention," to suit by the United States---at the instance and under the control of responsible federal officers-is not consent to suit by anyone whom
the United States might select; and even consent to suit by the United
States for a particular person's benefit is not consent to suit by that person
himself.
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785-86 (1991). Siegel's efforts to
distinguish Blatchford are not convincing. See Siegel, supra note 154, at 568-69 (arguing
that a suit by an individual as a more convenient derivation of the qui tam action is not
tantamount to the delegation of the federal government's exemption from state immunity).
But cf Morgan Mahon, Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and Retroactive Welfare
Benefits, 36 U. Plrr. L. REV. 78, 94 (1974) (positing that "the United States could vindicate [the] individual's right if it sued the State .... It seems that similar results would
issue from suits either by the United States or by the individual in most cases, thus the
difference in procedure is attributable only to the theoretical differences between the types
of suits, which indicates perhaps that the differences are no longer worth recognizing.").
159 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333 (1994).
160 See Siegel, supra note 154, at 553.
161 See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (consolidated with New
York v. Louisiana).
162 In both cases, the statutes were passed so that these northern states could assist
their citizens in the collection of Reconstruction bonds issued by the southern states. See
id. at 76-79.
163 See id. at 76-79, 89.
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"nothing more nor less than... mere collecting agent[s] of the owners
of the bonds and coupons, and while the suits are in the name of the
States, they are under the actual control of individual citizens, and are
prosecuted and carried on altogether by and for them." 164 The Eleventh
Amendment, therefore, barred prosecution of the suits. 165 Thus, if the
efforts of New Hampshire and New York were nothing more than subterfuge, the question must be asked: How is Siegel's proposition any different?
Siegel differentiates the federal version of this maneuver on two
grounds. First, he argues that, unlike New Hampshire and New York
who, according to the author, "were attempting to assert causes of action
not really theirs," the federal government would have an actual right of
action against the offending states as a result of a proposed Congressional
enactment. 166 Second, Siegel claims that "[riegardless of who really
owns the cause of action involved, the United States has the power to
regulate, via federal law, a state's behavior toward individuals. " ' 67 Both
of these arguments are offered to support Siegel's implicit distinction--that the federal government, unlike the states, would have a tangible interest in the prosecution and result of suits against the states. Perhaps this is so, but Siegel's analysis lacks rigor and demands a closer
look.
As an initial matter, the United States may have to do more than
point to statutory authority permitting it to sue the states. After all, New
York and New Hampshire brought suit under ostensibly valid statutory
authority as well. 16 Like state laws, federal legislation is subject to the
strictures of the Constitution. So why were New Hampshire and New
York forbidden to sue Louisiana on behalf of their citizens? Quite simply, these states had no interest in the causes of action they were authorized to prosecute--there was simply no controversy between the states
for the federal courts to resolve.169 Substituting the United States as the
plaintiff does not change the analysis. 170 For example, in United States
164 Id. at 89.
165 See id. at 91; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 n.12

(1972); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1923).
166 See Siegel, supra note 154, at 554.
167 See id.
168

See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 76-79 (1883).

169

See id. at 91 (holding that "in our opinion, one State cannot create a controversy

with another State, within the meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the
Constitution, by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other State to its citizens."); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
170 See John R. Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. REv. 447, 456-57
(1986).
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v. Minnesota,17 1 the United States brought suit against Minnesota seeking
the cancellation of certain patents issued to the state concerning land upon
which the Chippewa Indians held a superior claim. 172 Minnesota argued
that the real parties in interest were the Indians:
[Minnesota's] first proposition is that the suit is essentially one
brought by the Indians against the State, and therefore is not within
the original jurisdiction of this court. In support of the proposition it
is said that the United States is only a nominal party---a mere conduit

through which the Indians are asserting their private rights, -- that the
Indians are the real parties in interest and will be the sole beneficiaries
of any recovery, and that the United
173 States will not be affected
whether a recovery is had or denied.

The Court's response is illuminating: "It must be conceded that, if
the Indians are the real parties in interest and the United States only17a4

nominalparty, the suit is not within this Court's original jurisdiction."

Notably, the Court cited, among other authorities, New Hampshire v.
Louisiana as support for this statement.
Although the Court did conclude that the United States had a direct interest in the suit, 176 the fact

remains that such an interest must be present to support jurisdiction. 177

Admittedly, satisfying this prerequisite may not be too difficult in
most cases.17 8 Still, even if one assumes a casual "interest" nexus, the
171 270 U.S. 181 (1926).

172 See id. at 191-92. The United States did not bring suit pursuant to a federal
statute, but rather, out of a sense of obligation stemming from its treaty with the Chippewas.
See id. Had the United States relied upon statutory authority, the analysis nonetheless
would have been the same, although the result may have been easier to reach.
173 Id. at 193.
174 Id. (emphasis added).
175 See id. at 193 (citing New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S.
76 (1883) and North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923)); see also supra notes 161-165 and accompanymng text.

See United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 194 (1926).
177 See also Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 388 (1902) (concluding that the

United States was not merely a nominal party suing on behalf of an Indian tribe, but was
in fact a party with a substantial interest in the outcome of the suit); accord Dunlop v.
Rhode Island, 398 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (D.R.I. 1975) (finding that the United States had
an interest in prosecuting a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act "to redress a wrong
being done to the public good." (quoting Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir.
1965))). The need to defend federal standing is seen outside the Eleventh Amendment
context as well. For example, parties frequently questioned the federal government's
standing to sue on behalf of individuals when the presence of the United States as a party
was the sole basis for federal court jurisdiction. See Erickson v. United States, 264 U.S.
246, 248-49 (1924); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kenyon, 204 U.S. 349, 35659 (1907).

For example, in the United States v. Minnesota case, the Court found that the
United States had a "real and direct" interest in the dispute because "in many respects,"
the federal government was the guardian of the American Indians. See Minnesota, 270
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United States's interest in pursuing the personal, state law claims of
bankruptcy debtors is not immediately obvious. 7 9 Resorting to the
Constitution's proscription against nonuniform bankruptcy laws does not
supply the necessary federal interest. The Supreme Court's interpretation
of "uniform" as used in the Bankruptcy Clause is not stringent,13° so the
state's preferred status vis-a-vis other creditors does not appear to offend
the Constitution.
Perhaps a more promising argument in favor of federal standing is
based on the normative theory of bankruptcy law discussed above. The
Constitution empowers Congress to enact uniform bankruptcy legislation. 18 1 Congress's purpose in enacting such a law is to establish a collective remedy in response to the common pool problem, which gives the
federal government an interest in seeing that parties are not permitted to
opt out of that process--thereby securing more than their appropriate
share of the debtor's assets or shielding their own liability to the debtor
from the claims of the debtor's creditors. 13 2 Whether this theoretical interest in the debtor's ability to sue the states in bankruptcy court is sufficiently "real and direct" to satisfy a court is unclear, and perhaps, doubtful. 181
U.S. at 193-94; accord United States v. University of New Mexico, 731 F.2d 703, 706
(10th Cir. 1984). The standing of the United States to bring suit on behalf of individuals
pursuant to statutes passed under the authority of the Civil War Amendments is also unquestioned. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 138, 141 (1965); Louisiana
v.United States, 380 U.S. 145, 152 (1965).
179 Cf. Siegel, supra note 154, at 569 n.146 (making the overbroad
suggestion that
federal prosecution of a debtor's claims against the states in bankruptcy cannot be viewed
as a vindication of that debtor's federal rights). It is perhaps easier to see a federal interest when the subject of the debtor's claims arises out of the Bankruptcy Code itself as
would be the case in a preference suit, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994), or in an action to rectify
a violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). If the United States actually
purchased the debtor's claims against the states (or otherwise took a complete assignment
of them), its interest in the adjudication of those claims would be iron clad, although the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to resolve the claim undoubtedly would be lost. Cf.South
Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 310-12 (1904) (allowing a state that took title to
an individual's bonds to sue another state); Hitchcock, 185 U.S. at 388 (allowing the
United States to sue a state where the federal government had a direct interest in the suit).
This implausible scenario, however, does not warrant further consideration.
180 See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188-90 (1902).
181 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
182

See supra Section III.A.

183

Theoretical and fairly attenuated federal interests, however, have carried the day in

the past. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kenyon, 204 U.S. 349, 356-57
(1907) (finding that the federal government's interest in the construction of public works
is subserved when contractors working on such projects or supplying needed materials
are assured of prompt and due payment); University of New Mexico, 731 F.2d at 706
(holding that despite the absence of any treaty creating fiduciary duties on the part of the
United States, "Congress has 'pervasive authority, rooted in the Constitution, to control
[Native American] tribal property.'" (quoting Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks,
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Conditioning State Participation in Bankruptcy On Waiver
of Immunity

Congress may also consider reordering or conditioning the states'
bankruptcy claim priorities. 18 4 For example, it may condition state tax
claim priority on a state's voluntary waiver of its immunity. Daniel A.
Farber seems to have had a conditional participation in mind when he
wrote his short comment on Seminole Tribe.'15 Extrapolating from Ronald Coase's "brilliant insight" that even without traditional rules of tort
liability, economically efficient resolutions of tort disputes will occur, 16
Farber argues that bargaining renders legal rules irrelevant and results in
efficient outcomes. 187 In the Eleventh Amendment context, Farber notes
that Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived by the states.18 8
Furthermore, he argues that Congress can offer incentives for such waivers. 18 9 Because the mechanisms of a bargain exist, Farber sees no reason
why an agreement between the states and the United States on the immunity issue could not be achieved. 190 He concludes that "[i]t follows
from the Coase Theorem that, if Congress wants to eliminate immunity
more than the state wants to keep it, then it will be eliminated--regardless of whether the Constitution recognizes sovereign immunity or gives Congress the power to abrogate immunity. " 191 Thus,
Farber suggests that Seminole Tribe was correctly decided for all the
wrong reasons.192
430 U.S. 73, 83 (1977))).
184 Whether the bankruptcy priority for unsecured state taxes creates a perverse incentive as previously discussed is an interesting question whose answer must await another
day. For the purposes of my analysis, I assume that bankruptcy priorities in favor of the
states are appropriate. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994) (granting priority to allowed,
unsecured tax claims of governmental units).
195 See Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13
CONST. COMMENTARY 141 (1996).
186 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
187 See Farber, supra note 185, at 142.
188 See id.

1 C9
QF South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (noting that "Congress may
attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds ... ."); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co.,
377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding that Congress may condition "the right to operate a
railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court ...
190 See Farber, supra note 185, at 142.
191 Id. In support of the decision, the author argues that the rule of Seminole Tribe
minimizes transaction costs because Congress is better able to "bribe" the states into
giving up their immunity than the states are able to "bribe" Congress to leave them immune in a world where Congress has the power to abrogate immunity. See id. at 143.
192 See id. at 143 & nn.6-7. It is curious that no economic critique is leveled against
the rule of sovereign immunity itself. The operation of the rule interferes with the unimpeded bargaining of individual claimants and state defendants. If this artificial barrier to
efficient bargaining was removed outright, the question of Congress's efficient bargain
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There is, unfortunately, a "transaction cost" that Farber has not
taken into account--namely, Justice Scalia. Before the conservatives
commanded the Court, Justice Scalia, in his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Union Gas, questioned whether conditioning participation in
federal programs on a waiver of state immunity can ever be appropriate:
Parden is the only case in which we have held that the Federal Government can demand, as a condition to its permission of state action

regulable under the Commerce Clause, the waiver of state sovereign
immunity ....
In Pefty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275
(1959), we said that a condition of suability of the Bridge Commission, which we interpreted Congress to have attached to its approval
of the interstate compact creating the Commission, was accepted by
the States when they implemented the compact. That was an alternative holding, since we also found that the terms of the compact itself
made the Commission suable. Obviously, moreover, what Congress
may exact with respect to new entities created by compacts that the
States have no constitutional power to make without its explicit consent may be greater than what it may exact in other contexts.
Two terms ago, in Welch, we overruled Parden insofar as that
case spoke to the clarity of language necessary to constitute such a
demand. We explicitly declined to address, however, the continuing
validity of Parden's holding that the Commerce Clause provided the
constitutional power to make such a demand. I would drop the other
shoe.
There are obvious and fatal difficulties in acknowledging such a
power if no Commerce Clause power to abrogate state sovereign immunity exists. All congressional creations of private rights of action
attach recovery to the defendant's commission of some act, or possession of some status, in a field where Congress has authority to
regulate conduct. Thus, all federal prescriptions are, insofar as their
prospective application is concerned, in a sense conditional, and-4o
the extent that the objects of the prescriptions consciously engage in
the activity or hold the status that produces liability--can be redescribed as invitations to "waiver." . . . At bottom, then, to acknowledge that the Federal Government can make the waiver of state sovereign immunity a condition to the State's action in a field that

Congress has authority to regulate is substantially the same as acknowledging that the Federal Government can eliminate state soverwith the states to waive immunity would become moot. Compare Matthew L. Spitzer,
Note, An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 515, 548
(1977) (concluding that the government should be able to be sued in tort) with WRINER Z.
HIRscH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYsIS 242-43 (2d ed. 1988)
(arguing that a limited rule of sovereign immunity is justified in order to attract talented
people to government service).
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eign immunity in the exercise of its Article I powers ....
There is
little more than a verbal distinction between saying that Congress can
make the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania liable to private parties for
hazardous-waste cleanup costs on sites that the Commonwealth owns
and operates, and saying the same thing but adding at the end "if the
Commonwealth chooses to own and operate them." If state sovereign
immunity has any reality, it must mean more than this..193

Of course now, according to Seminole Tribe, Congress does not
have authority to abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause.
This, coupled with the fact that Justice Scalia now represents the voice of
the majority, does not bode well for the future success of legislation that
conditions state participation in a federal sphere on waiver. By eliminating the bargaining room recognized by Farber, Justice Scalia would force
an inefficient resolution to the immunity issue, thereby harming the states
contrary to his intended goal of protecting them.
C. Measures Not Requiring Legislative Initiative
1. Judicial Options
One can always wait passively for a reconstitution of the Supreme
Court and the possibility of a new interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to resolve this dilemma. This seemed to be Justice Stevens's hope
in predicting that "the better reasoning in Justice Souter's far wiser and
far more4 scholarly opinion [in Seminole Tribe] will surely be the law one
19
day."
A more proactive approach might call upon the Young doctrine. If a
state or state agency violates the automatic stay or the discharge injunction, for example, a Young-type suit might lie against an appropriate state
official. Whether the debtor can do anything to get back property taken
by a state in violation of the automatic stay is unclear. 195 The specter of
damages and other possible sanctions against a state officer individually,
however, may make Code violations less attractive even when the court is
without authority to reach property of the debtor once in the hands of the
state. 196
193 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42-44 & n.1 (1989)
(Scalia, J., con-

curring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
194 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1145 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 But see Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1947) (acknowledging that states

maybe required to return segregated, identifiable property pursuant to an injunction).

In the context of the debate over corporate limited liability, some commentators
similarly have argued that a rule that holds a firm's management responsible for the torts
committed by the firm would provide adequate incentive to avoid excessive risk taking by
the firm. See Paul Halpern, et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corpora-
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Recall that the Court in Seminole Tribe indicated that it would not
grant relief based on the Young doctrine when Congress
•
.. had
197 already included a specific, definite remedy in the statute in question.
This gloss
will surely limit the utility of the Young doctrine in the future. The
Bankruptcy Code, however, which generally leaves it to the bankruptcy
courts to devise appropriate remedies for Code violations, does not appear to implicate this concern. Whether Young-type suits in bankruptcy
will survive
the case-by-case balancing test of Coeur d' Alene is less
1 98
clear.
The debtor also might consider suing a state defendant in its own
courts. State immunity from suit in local courts has been narrowed drastically over the past several decades. 19 9 Furthermore, with regard to
causes of action arising out of the Code itself, a debtor may be permitted
to bring such suits against the states in their own courts notwithstanding
an assertion of sovereign immunity. This "anomalous" 20 0 result was
sanctioned by the Court in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways
Commission.2° 1 In that case, Hilton, an individual, attempted to sue the
State of South Carolina in federal district court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).20 2 While the case was pending in the
district court, the Supreme Court announced its Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation decision. 203 The Welch
Court held that Congress had not expressed an unmistakably clear intention to subject states to suit in federal court in the Jones Act, which incorporates the remedial scheme of FELA. 20 4 Reasonably believing that
South Carolina would be immune from his suit as a result, Hilton voluntarily dismissed his complaint in federal court and refiled his action in a
South Carolina state court. 205 The state trial and appellate courts all held
that FELA did not authorize suits against the states in their own
206
207
courts.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a majority opinion joined by an interesting cross-section of the
Court, Justice Kennedy concluded that Hilton's suit could be maintained
.

don Law, 30 U. ToRONTO L.J. 117, 149 (1980).
197 See supra notes 52, 125-127 and accompanying text.

198
199
200
201

See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
See Howlett v.Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990).
502 U.S. 197, 206 (1991). This result was hinted at by the Court in General Oil

Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1908).
20M See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199.
2M 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
20 See id. at 476.
25 See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199-200.
See id.at 200-01.
M7 See id. at 201.
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in state court. 208 Noting that the Court had already concluded in Parden
that FELA applied to the states, the majority thought the resolution of the
Hilton case was simply a matter of stare decisis.
The Court was not
troubled by the partial overruling of Parden by Welch, which held that
FELA did not contain a sufficiently clear abrogation of state immunity
for purposes of suit in federal court. 2 10 That portion of the Parden decision holding that FELA applied to the states was still good law, and thus,
the Court noted, neither the Eleventh Amendment
211 nor the question of abrogation applied to Hilton's suit in state court.
The majority's opinion is somewhat oblique, although the dissent
spelled out quite plainly the ramifications of the majority's conclusion:
The clear statement rule, the Court says, was required in Welch because the Eleventh Amendment was implicated. In Will, by contrast,
use of the clear statement rule was somewhat discretionary, because
the issue in that case was a question of statutory interpretation in
which the Constitution was not implicated. Because this case involves
state sovereign immunity in state court, not federal court, and the
Eleventh Amendment does not by its terms apply, the Court holds that
the clear statement rule in this "nonconstitutional" context can be
trumped by stare decisis ....
From this standpoint, it makes little sense to apply the clear
statement rule to congressional enactments that make the States liable
to damages suits in federal courts, but not to apply the clear statement
rule to congressional enactments that make the States liable to dam-

ages suits in their own courts. Sovereign immunity, a crucial attribute of separate governments, is infringed in both cases. The suggested dichotomy makes even less sense if we consider the remarkable
anomaly that these two canons of statutory construction create: a
statutory scheme in which state courts are
2 12 the exclusive avenue for
obtaining recovery under afederal statute.

Thus, Hilton advances the remarkable proposition that Congress can

subject states to suit under a federal statute in their own courts even if the
states would be immune from suit under the same statute in the federal
courts.
208

213

Apart from the fact that this conclusion is hard to reconcile

See id. at 207. The majority consisted of Justice Kennedy, who delivered the

opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, and Souter.
See id. at 198.
209 See id. at 201-03.
210 See id. at 204-05.
211 See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 204-07.
212 See id. at 209-10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
213 See Amar, supranote 28, at 1476-77 & nn.209-10. What is perhaps most startling
about the opinion is that its blueprints were drawn up by Justice Brennan in the dissent to
the Court's decision in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 74-77 (1989)
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with earlier Court pronouncements on this issue, 2 14 the direction of this
case seems very much at odds with the Court's approach to state sovereign immunity generally.2 15 But because the majority included a number
of conservative Justices, including Chief Justice Rehnquist who authored
the Seminole Tribe decision, the precedent seems to be in no immediate
danger of reversal.
Because section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code unquestionably establishes Congress's intent to make the states responsive to numerous causes
of action under the Code, it would appear that the states cannot rely on
their common law sovereign immunity to frustrate such suits by debtors
216
in state court.
When the debtor wishes to pursue in state court a Bankruptcy Code cause of action or a state cause of action against which the

state has no immunity, a bankruptcy court might permit such a suit to go
forward under § 1334 of title 28 of the United States Code, or under sec-

tion 305 of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 17 This process may be slower-a
concern if the state has violated the automatic stay and its infraction is
ongoing or interferes with the debtor's reorganization--and will frustrate
the bankruptcy policy of speedy and collective estate administration. It is

not, in the end, a practical or attractive alternative.
(Brennan, J, dissenting). At the time, the conservative Justices were unanimously opposed to Justice Brennan's thesis.
214 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). The Howlett Court declared that
[tihe anomaly identified by the State Supreme Court, and by the various
state courts which it cited, that a State might be forced to entertain in its
own courts suits from which it was immune in federal court, is thus fully
met by our decision in 1Wl. Will establishes that the State and arms of the
State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity,
are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Wil Court noted that because
a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims, and that Congress did not provide such a
federal forum for civil rights claims against States, we cannot accept petitioner's argument that Congress intended nevertheless to create a cause of
action against States to be brought in state courts, which are precisely the
courts Congress sought to allow civil rights claimants to avoid through §
1983.
See 1 ll, 491 U.S. at 66. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to believe that suit in the
state courts would only be possible with state consent. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.14 (1996) (noting that "this Court is empowered to review a
question of federal law arising from a state court decision where a State has consented to
suit.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
215 See supra Sections I-II.
216 See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70
AM. BANKR. L. J. 195, 206-07 (1996); see also Howlett, 496 U.S. at 383 (declaring that
"as to persons that Congress subjected to liability, individual States may not exempt such
persons from federal liability by relying on their own common-law heritage.").
217 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1994) (discretionary and mandatory abstention); 11
U.S.C. § 305 (1991) (suspension of case).
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Sections 106(b) and (c) of the Bankruptcy Code

As a practical matter, the states will often subject themselves to the
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction when they file proofs of claim in bankruptcy cases.218 When this occurs, section 106(b) (compulsory counterclaim waiver) and section 106(c) (permissive counterclaim waiver) will
come into play.
Pursuant to section 106(b), when a state files a proof of claim, 2 19 it
is deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity with respect to all
claims belonging to the debtor that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the state's claim. 220 Case law interpreting "transaction or
occurrence" for the purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a)
can be used by analogy when making the similar determination under
section 106(b). 22 1 Generally, a court will look to see if there is a
"logical relationship" between the two claims.= In the past, this test
has been applied flexibly.= m Now that section 106(a) has been undermined, the courts should apply the test even more liberally.
218
219

This will most often occur when the state has a tax claim against the debtor.
There was some debate surrounding the old version of section 106(b)-then sec-

tion 106(a)--about whether that version of the statute contemplated the filing of a proof
of claim by the state or whether the state could "waive" its immunity merely by holding a
claim against the estate, even when not yet asserted. Compare 995 Fifth Ave. Assoc. v.
New York Dep't of Taxation & Fin. (In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assoc.), 963 F.2d 503, 509
n.1 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Dillon, 148 B.R. 852, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992), and
Unicare Homes, Inc. v. Four Seasons Care Ctrs., Inc. (In re Four Seasons Care Ctrs.,
Inc.), 119 B.R. 681, 685 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (filing of proof of claim required), with
Sullivan v. Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc. (In re Town & Country Home
Nursing Servs., Inc.), 963 F.2d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 1991); Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. New York Dep't of State (In re Operation Open City, Inc.), 170 B.R.
818, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Mims v. United States (In re Craftsmen, Inc.), 163 B.R.
88, 91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993), and Inslaw, Inc. v. United States (In re Inslaw, Inc.),
76 B.R. 224, 229 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1987) (filing of proof of claim not required). Cf.
Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989)
(asserting that "[n]either § 106(a) nor § 106(b) provides a basis for petitioner's actions
here, since respondents did not file a claim in either Chapter 7 proceeding."). The debate has been legislatively settled. The revised version of section 106(b) expressly requires the filing of a proof of claim by the state. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994); accord
In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 229-30 (D.P.R. 1996); Employment Dev. Dep't v. Joseph
(In re HPA Assocs.), 191 B.R. 167, 171-72 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994).
221 See WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1005 &
n.12 (1st Cir. 1988).
222 See, e.g., Ashbrook v. Block, 917 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States
Lines (S.A.) v. United States (In re McLean Indus.), 162 B.R. 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y.
1993), rev'd on other grounds, 30 F.3d 385, 388 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
934 (1995); United States v. Bulson (In re Bulson), 117 B.R. 537, 541 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1990), aff'd without opinion, 974 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992).
Op See, e.g., United States v. Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc.,
153 B.R. 539, 541-42
(N.D. I1. 1993); United States Lines (S.A.) v. United States (In re McLean Indus.), 132
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Section 106(b) is by no means above challenge. To the extent that it
is interpreted as conditioning state participation in the bankruptcy process
on the waiver of immunity, 224 such a statutory design has drawn the
criticism of at least one influential member of the Court, as discussed
above. 225 Even under a traditional waiver analysis, section 106(b) may
be seen as an unwarranted extension of state liability. In the past, the
Supreme Court has held that a state effects a limited waiver of its immunity when it files a claim in the bankruptcy court. 226 Indeed, filing a
claim in bankruptcy court would have probably effected such a waiver of
immunity even without section 106. But the states' exposure appears
limited to a defensive response by the debtor: "The whole process of
proof, allowance, and distribution is, shortly speaking, an adjudication of
interests in a res. It is none the less such because the claim is rejected in
toto, reduced in part, given a priority inferior to that claimed, or satisfied
in some way other than payment in cash." 227 The lower courts have so
limited the scope of similar waivers by claim assertion, permitting only
an offset of the claims of the respondent that arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the state's claim. 22 Allowing affirmative recovery by the debtor, as section 106(b) does, subjects the states to greater
exposure than the courts have allowed in the past.229
While section 106(b) by its terms is therefore rather more liberal
than existing precedents, one court has argued that a state waives its sovereign immunity completely when it files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy

B.R. 247, 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), aftd, 162 B.R. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 30 F.3d 385, 388 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
M4 See 995 Fifth Ave. Assoc., 963 F.2d at 508; WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1003 (1st Cir. 1988) (concluding that Congress may condition participation in a federal program on a waiver of state immunity if its intention to do
so is clear).
M Compare supra notes 81-86, 173-81 and accompanying text (discussing conditional
waiver and its detractors) with supra note 224 and accompanying text.
26

See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1947).

27 Gardner, 329 U.S. at 574; cf. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co.,

309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940) (explaining that federal immunity limits counterclaims
against the United States to the amount of the government's claim against the counterclaimant).
2n See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 946-47 (Fed. Cir.
1993),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); Livera v. First Nat'l State Bank, 879 F.2d 1186,
1195-96 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom, Livera v. Small Bus. Admin., 493 U.S.
937 (1989); Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967); United States

v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 910 (D.N.H. 1985); see also 3 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET
AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.28, at 13-160 to 13-164 (2d ed. 1996); 6 CHARLES
ALAN WRiGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1427, at 19798(2d ed. 1990).

Accord Gibson, supra note 216, at 209-11; Browning, supra note 130, at 10 & n.7.
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Although this theory was initially unpopular 23 1 and seemed to

render the express but narrow provisions of sections 106(b) and 106(c)
superfluous, other bankruptcy courts now appear to accept this theory. 23 It is, however, simply not consistent with Supreme Court precedent.234
Section 106(c) permits the debtor, notwithstanding any assertion of
sovereign immunity by a state, to "offset" against a claim or interest of
that state all claims belonging to the debtor. 2 5 Although the debtor cannot obtain affirmative, monetary relief under this provision, the debtor is
not limited by the transaction or occurrence requirement.1 3 1 Unlike section 106(b), section 106(,c) does not expressly require the state to have
filed a proof of claim.
It is hard to imagine how simply holding a
claim against an entity that happens to become a bankruptcy debtor can

230 See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare (In re Sacred Heart
Hosp.), 199 B.R. 129, 133-35 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 204 B.R. 132, 138 (E.D.
Pa. 1997); Downingtown Indus. & Agric. Sch. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ. (In re
Downingtown Indus. & Agric. Sch.), 172 B.R. 813, 820-23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994);
Hiser v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Saint Mary Hosp.), 125 B.R. 422,
425-26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re St. Joseph's Hosp.), 103 B.R. 643, 649-51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). Each
case illustrates how the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania relied,
by analogy, on the Supreme Court cases of Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44-45
(1990), and Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58-59 (1989), both of which
hold that a party waives its Seventh Amendment right to jury trial and subjects itself to the
equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court when it files a claim in a bankruptcy case).
21 See Unicare Homes, Inc. v. Four Seasons Care Cirs., Inc. (In re Four
Seasons
Care Ctrs., Inc.), 119 B.R. 681, 683-84 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
232 The pioneering bankruptcy court's response to this criticism is not convincing. See
Sacred Heart, 199 B.R. at 135. This response, however, is somewhat reminiscent of a
similar justification offered by the Hoffman dissent in support of its interpretation of the
interaction among former sections 106(a), (b) and (c). See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't
of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 113 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233 See Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 200 B.R. 282, 287-88 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga.
1996); Storey v. Toledo (In re Cook United, Inc.), 117 B.R. 301, 304-05 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1990). But see Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare (In re Sacred
Heart Hosp.), 204 B.R. 132, 140-42 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (reversing the pioneering bankrumy court's reliance on the claim as complete waiver theory).
See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) (asserting that "[w]hen the
State becomes the actor and files a claim against the fund, it waives any immunity which
it otherwise might have had respecting adjudicationof the claim.") (emphasis added).
235 See 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1994).
2M See id. The elimination of the transaction or occurrence requirement in subsection
(c), like the affirmative recovery permitted under subsection (b), represents a liberalization of the narrow attributes and consequences of similar waivers under nonbankruptcy
precedents. See supra note 228 and accompanying text; see also Gibson, supra note 216,
at 210.

237 See 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1994); see also supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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238
rise to the level of a constitutional waiver of state sovereign immunity.
It is thus likely that the courts will require, as a prerequisite, the filing of
a proof of claim by the state or, at least, sufficient participation by the
state in the bankruptcy case such that there is a clear waiver of immunity
by conduct.239
A few open questions remain regarding subsections (b) and (c) that
may well be decided in favor of debtors given the new regime that so
heavily favors the states. First, assuming that it is proper to grant a
debtor affirmative relief against a state,
should a court permit the
debtor to recover its transaction or occurrence claim under section 106(b)
and then make the state resort to the claims process to secure payment of
its own claim (often at pennies on the dollar)? Alternatively, should a
court offset the two claims and allow affirmative recovery of the excess
amount only? One court has held that the debtor is only entitled to the
difference between the two claims. 241 Intuitively, this seems like the correct result. If netting is required under nonbankruptcy law in analogous
situations, the same result should follow in bankruptcy. 242 Without any
concrete answers in the Bankruptcy Code or the legislative history, however, a bankruptcy court has some discretion to enlarge further the consequences of a state waiver by claim.
Similarly, how should the court apply a debtor's claims against the
state if the debtor holds several claims, some of which arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the state's claim and others that do not? The debtor will wish to offset the unrelated claims first,
thereby reserving the transaction or occurrence claims for subsequent
application. In this way, the transaction or occurrence claims will more
likely exceed any residual state claims remaining after the initial offset,
thus supporting a money judgment for the debtor. The Bankruptcy Code
does not suggest a proper ordering of claims. In light of the tenuous basis of section 106(b)'s affirmative relief aspect, however,
a court may
2 43
hesitate to maximize the debtor's recovery any further.
Because states are represented in bankruptcy cases by their various
agencies, a question has surfaced regarding the filing of a claim by one

See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
239 Cf. Town & Country Home Nursing Servs., Inc. (In re Town & Country Home
Nursing Servs., Inc.), 963 F.2d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding waiver by conduct);
United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 113 B.R. 802, 811-12 (D.D.C. 1989) (same).
240 See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
241 See United States v. McPeck, 910 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1990).
242 But see supra note 227 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court has
238

suggested that a state's claim that has been filed in a bankruptcy case can be subordinated
by the bankruptcy judge).
See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
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state agency and whether that waives the immunity of other agencies and
indeed the state itself. When section 106(b) is at issue, with its transaction or occurrence requirement, the question is moot. 2 44 This is not the
case for section 106(c). Furthermore, it is certainly not the case if one
245
subscribes to the "claim as complete waiver" theory described above.
In the section 106(c) context, most courts have interpreted the filing of a
claim in bankruptcy by a single state agency as a waiver of immunity for
the entire state and all of its other agencies. 246 Again, with the deck
stacked so heavily in the state's favor, this trend is likely to continue
among the lower courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that Seminole Tribe has added a large measure
of uncertainty to bankruptcy proceedings involving states. Certainly
carving out special preferences for a particular creditor group is antithetical to the notion that bankruptcy is a collective process aimed at ameliorating the common pool problem. 247 The system will surely adjust to the
consequences of Seminole Tribe, as far as it is able, in an attempt to regain lost balance. It is not clear, however, that any measure will neutralize the advantages given to the states in Seminole Tribe.2M It will be interesting to see how the bankruptcy courts, debtors, and other creditors
react to the states' newly acquired status. It will be even more interesting
to see how aggressively the states take advantage of it.

24 See Davis v. United States Postal Service (in re Leeth Construction, Inc.), 170
B.R. 684, 688 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
245 See supra notes 230-234 and accompanying text. Indeed, one of the critical flaws
of the "claim as complete waiver" theory is that there is no substantive reason to apply it
only to § 106(c) and not to § 106(b). If applied to the latter, however, it would write out
of the statute the "transaction or occurrence" test Congress saw fit to include. Accord
Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 204
B.R. 132, 140-41 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
M See Gibson v. United States (In re Gibson), 176 B.R. 910, 914-16 (Bankr. D. Or.
1994); Downingtown Indus. & Agric. Sch. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ. (In re Downingtown Indus. & Agric. Sch.), 172 B.R. 813, 822 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); HughesBechtol, Inc. v. Ohio (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 124 B.R. 1007, 1016-17 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1991).
247 See supra Section III.A.
2" Indeed, one rather panicked commentator has gone so far as to predict the
resurrection of the old Act injunctions as a way of keeping the states in check. See Browning,
supra note 130, at 10.

